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Abstract:  The most significant barrier to the wide adoption of cloud services has been attributed to 
perceived cloud insecurity (Smitha, Anna and Dan, 2012). In an attempt to review this subject, this 
paper will explore some of the major security threats to the cloud and the security models employed in 
tackling them. Access control violations, message integrity violations, data leakages, inability to 
guarantee complete data deletion, code injection, malwares and lack of expertise in cloud technology 
rank the major threats. The European Union invested €3m in City University London to research into 
the certification of Cloud security services. This and more recent developments are significant in 
addressing increasing public concerns regarding the confidentiality, integrity and privacy of data held 
in cloud environments. Some of the current cloud security models adopted in addressing cloud 
security threats were – Encryption of all data at storage and during transmission. The Cisco IronPort 
S-Series web security appliance was among security solutions to solve cloud access control issues. 
2-factor Authentication with RSA SecurID and close monitoring appeared to be the most popular 
solutions to authentication and access control issues in the cloud. Database Active Monitoring, File 
Active Monitoring, URL Filters and Data Loss Prevention were solutions for detecting and preventing 
unauthorised data migration into and within clouds. There is yet no guarantee for a complete deletion 
of data by cloud providers on client requests however; FADE may be a solution (Yang et al., 2012). 
Keywords: Cloud Security, Security Threats, Security Solutions. 
1. Introduction 
Cloud computing is a new technology paradigm that promises huge benefits to its users. It is all about 
computing resource sharing to increase efficiency while reducing the overhead of administration and 
other IT costs. Cloud computing avails a convenient and ubiquitous access to highly on-demand 
elastic computing resource pool in the form of computing infrastructure, platform or software. The 
NIST has defined cloud computing as a model to enable ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources such as networks, servers, storage, 
applications and services; that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
effort or service provider interaction (NIST, 2012). Amazon Web Service (AWS) launched in 2006 was 
among the first cloud computing implementations and Eucalyptus was the first open source platform 
for cloud deployment.  
Cloud computing has become very attractive especially to individuals and start-up companies due to 
its scalability, accessibility, relative inexpensiveness and service oriented Pay-As-You-Use model 
(Sichao, 2012). This imply that start-up companies get up and running with huge computational 
resources in a matter of minutes by signing up accounts with cloud computing vendors and may pay 
only when they utilise those resources. That way, cloud consumers may not have to worry about huge 
upfront investments in IT Staff, IT infrastructure, software, maintenance etc. depending on their 
subscription, instead these are taken care of by the Cloud Service Provider (CSP). Many 
organisations have signed up with CSPs and migrated their data to the cloud and more are 
considering cloud computing given its promise of numerous benefits (Louis and Andreas 2012). 
Governments are not left out in this shift to cloud computing. For instance, on the 8th of February 
2011, the United States released Federal Cloud Computing Strategy and proposed to commit $20 
billion Government spending to cloud computing (Vivek, 2011). In 2009, revenue generated from 
cloud computing were estimated to be around USD 17 billion and the forecast was that it would 
amount to USD 44.2 billion by 2013, however, by 2010, the revenues were estimated to be about 
USD 68.3 billion and to reach USD 148.8 billion by 2014 (Daniele and Giles, 2009) (Christy and 
Laurence, 2010). This is an indication of how rapidly individuals, organisations and Governments are 
adopting cloud computing.  
There are four types of cloud deployments (Wei et al., 2012). 
 
 Private cloud 
The Cloud infrastructure and management is located on a specific organisation’s premise or 
elsewhere and operated for and available to only that organisation.     
 
 Community cloud 
A cloud infrastructure shared by specific number of organisations with a common goal (e.g. 
security enforcement agencies and governments). It may be provided by different CSPs. It 
may be deployed within either of the participant organisations premise or externally and may 
be managed internally or externally (Yashpalsinh and Kirit, 2012). 
 
 Public cloud  
A public cloud may be owned and provided by a single CSP and is available to anyone who 
may freely sign-up accounts with the CSP. 
 
 Hybrid cloud  
A mix of two cloud deployment types (e.g. a private cloud that accesses public clouds), it may 
be provided by different CSPs but interoperate for e.g. load balancing (cloud bursting).  
 
Figure 1 shows a model of the cloud deployment types as described above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Figure 1: Cloud deployment types.  
  
Cloud deployment types adopt three Service Delivery models (SDM) –  
 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
CSP provisions and cloud consumer rents and manages computing storage, networks, 
operating systems, applications etc. The consumer has no control over the underlying 
infrastructure. 
 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
PaaS provides the capability for a cloud consumer to deploy software and applications on the 
CSP’s cloud platform. 
 
 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
A consumer uses applications provided by the CSP such as cloud based emails, 
spreedsheets, ERPs, UI design applications etc.  
 
Composite as a Service has also been categorised as a cloud SDM in some articles. It is common 
with CSPs to garnish their products with N + aaS names e.g. Security as a Service (SaaS). Figure 2 
shows cloud Service Delivery Models with some cloud service providers and some of their customers. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 2: Cloud service delivery models, cloud service providers & their customers 
 
In the early years of cloud computing, there were no cloud computing standards. Therefore, different 
CSPs used different frameworks and platforms to implement and deploy their cloud offerings mainly 
based on Service Oriented Architectures, utility computing and Virtualization. However due to the 
need for cloud interoperability, increased consumer adoption, security and privacy, better service 
standards; standard organizations such as the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), Open Cloud Manifesto (OCM), Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) and The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program 
(FedRAMP) are now engaged in cloud computing accreditations, certifications or standardizations 
(Xiang and Bo, 2011)  (Kevin, 2011). 
 
In a quest to explore cloud computing paradigm, there is a lot of research going on around cloud 
computing. However, due to the cost and complexity involved in carrying out some researches within 
a live cloud computing environment, majority of researches in cloud computing are carried out as 
simulations using cloud simulation tools such as CloudSim, GreenCloud, Open Cirrus and iCanCloud 
(Wei et al., 2012). Dr. Lawrence Chung’s research team at UT Dallas claim to have found how to build 
a more efficient cloud and have secured grants from Google to use Google App Engine (GAE) to 
verify their benchmarking and simulation project in a real cloud environment (LaKisha, 2013).  
 
As common with all new technologies, they come with their advantages and disadvantages. The most 
significant barrier to the wide adoption of cloud services has been attributed to perceived cloud 
insecurity (Smitha, Anna and Dan, 2012). According to the IDC, 87.5% of CIO’s have security and 
privacy as top concerns hindering their adoption of cloud computing, also the Government 
Technology Research Alliance have reported that the major impediment towards adopting cloud 
computing is security and loss of privacy (Akhil and Kanika, 2012). The security threat posed by cloud 
computing to individuals and businesses cannot be over-emphasized, as this is evident through some 
recent cloud computing security events - Amazon cloud failure which caused Distributed Denial of 
Service to other clouds, web hosting companies, organisations and individuals that depended on it, 
and the Google and Sony cloud data leakages that affected the confidentiality and privacy of 
thousands of their customers in 2009, are examples (Murat, Alain and SingRu, 2011) (Xiang and Bo, 
2011). Jason Hart, vice-president of cloud solutions at SafeNet reported that 89% of security 
personnel around the world are not clear on how to keep information in the cloud protected at all 
times (BCS The Chartered Institute for IT, 2013). With cloud computing in the hands of malicious 
users, catastrophic malware and virus attacks could be launched against other cloud infrastructures 
and internet users turning clouds into the biggest botnets. As the clouds pose security threats to cloud 
customers, these threats are as a result of security threats to the clouds amongst other reasons.  
 
In a view towards addressing increasing public concerns regarding the confidentiality, integrity and 
privacy of data held in cloud environments, the security industry, CSPs, academia, governments and 
various stakeholders have continued to work towards a secure cloud environment. For instance, the 
 
European Union invested €3m in City University London to research into the certification of Cloud 
security services (City University London, 2012). The UK Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills together with the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council are investing £7.5 
Million to train data security experts at University of London and Oxford University (BCS The 
Chartered Institute for IT, 2013). In an attempt to review this subject, this paper will explore some of 
the major security threats to the cloud and the security models employed in tackling them. 
           
2.  Cloud security threats  
 
In September 2012, the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) top threats 
publication, lists the following threats against cloud computing as emergent and on the increase –  
 Code injection and directory traversal 
 Drive by exploits 
 Information leakage (especially with increased use of mobile devices) 
 Insider threats 
 Identity theft (especially with increased use of mobile devices) 
 Targeted attacks 
 
There is a basic lack of control over cloud-based environments and uncertainty over how to deal with 
insider threats, compliance duties and mobile access (BCS The Chartered Institute for IT, 2013). 
According to the CSA, the notorious nine cloud computing top threats in 2013 in order of severity are: 
 Data Breaches  
 Data Loss 
 Account Hijacking 
 Insecure APIs 
 Denial of Service 
 Malicious Insiders 
 Abuse of Cloud Services 
 Insufficient Due Diligence 
 Shared Technology Issues 
 
Other security threats we identified were: 
 Incorrect Hypervisor security implementations in non-private IaaS cloud environments. 
 Wrong firewall usages and wrong firewall and access control implementations. 
 Predominant use of Vulnerable Distributed Database Systems (DDS). 
 Malwares. 
 
The next section will discuss some of the threats listed above under the following headings - Abuse of 
Cloud Services, Lack of expertise in cloud technology, Inability to guarantee complete data deletion, 
Message integrity violations, Data leakages, Authentication Issues, Inadequate Monitoring, Insecure 
interfaces and APIs, Social engineering, drive by exploits and insider threats and Access control 
violations. 
 
2.1 IaaS threats 
 Abuse of cloud services 
Currently, there are no physical interactions in purchasing cloud services and most CSP’s do 
not conduct routine inspection on the activities of their IaaS users due to privacy rules, in 
cases where the latter does not apply, attackers patterns and strategies change over time 
making attack discoveries and protection even more difficult. Malicious users with forged or 
stolen bank details could purchase IaaS cloud services and use them to serve malware or 
perform phishing attacks against other cloud users, as earlier mentioned, turning the cloud 
into biggest botnet (Eric et al., 2010).  This threat is also applicable in PaaS cloud 
infrastructure. 
 
 Lack of expertise in cloud technology 
Research has also shown that there are not enough competent security personnel in securing 
the volumes of data held in cloud environments. Several cloud security issues have also been 
attributed to incorrect security configurations in the cloud (BCS The Chartered Institute for IT, 
2013) (Nasser, 2013). For instance, (1) defining security configurations on a hypervisor pose 
a security threat as VMs completely lose their security when they are relocated (Chris, 2011) 
and (2) the use of DDS API calls are vulnerable to SQL-Injection attacks (Steve, 2011). 
 
2.2 PaaS threats 
 Inability to guarantee complete data deletion 
Due to the distributed storage nature of the cloud and collaborations between several cloud 
service providers (e.g. cloud bursting), guaranteeing the complete deletion of a client’s data 
on the client’s request is still an issue. This affects several cloud consumers by causing 
unwanted vendor lock-ins and privacy issue. 
 
 Message integrity violations 
Research has shown that some CSPs do not apply sufficient encryption and some do not 
encrypt all data stored in the cloud due to the overhead of encryption and the inability to 
process all encrypted data respectively. This has led to message integrity violations which 
pose a serious security threat to cloud consumer’s privacy (Intel IT Centre, 2011). It is also 
known that the privacy of cloud consumers files stored in the cloud are threatened by 
deduplication attacks. Malicious users can easily identify other users file; learn the contents of 
those files as well as save the files in a remote control centre (Danny, Benny and Alexandra, 
2010). 
 
2.3 SaaS threats 
 Inadequate Monitoring 
As also mentioned earlier, fine grained auditing and traceback is difficult to realise in cloud 
environments due to shared log files. In networked environments, hardware association could 
be used to establish traceback however, virtualization makes such association more difficult 
to establish. Privacy rules also contribute a threat to security as most cloud customers only 
want their activities to be monitored for charging and accounting purposes only (Sravan and 
Upendra, 2010). 
 
2.4 Common threats 
 Authentication Issues 
Existing password-based authentication has an inherited limitation, cause several drawbacks 
and poses significant risks.  Trust propagation for an authenticated user’s security context 
between various interoperating clouds is yet to be fully realised within cloud environments. 
 
 Data leakages 
As mentioned previously, the multi-tenancy characteristic of cloud environments pose a 
significant data leakage threat. There is a good documentation of breaking out of one VM into 
another within the same host as well as URL traversal making it possible for a malicious 
tenant to access other tenant’s data. Data leakage during cloud bursting is also common due 
to heterogeneity between different clouds. The different security requirements and trust 
relations for different tenants is thought as to make a multi-tenant cloud a single point of 
compromise due to complex security and trust issues (Hassan, James and Gail, 2010). 
 
 Insecure interfaces and APIs 
The cause of most application security issues has been attributed to bad application 
development practices. Cloud environments also use applications which are built for in-house 
deployments therefore, suffer from any bugs in such applications too (Carl, 2009) (Sravan 
and Upendra, 2010) (Steve, 2013). DDS systems such as CouchDB, FlockDB, Hive, 
MongoDB, RavenDB and SimpleDB use API calls (NoSQL) to perform CRUD operations for 
applications instead of SQL. There are documentations for vulnerabilities in DDS such as 
limited support for Dynamic Application Testing Tools (DAST), lack of support for native 
encryption and hashing, SQL-Injection etc. (Steve, 2011). 
 
 Social engineering, drive by exploits and insider threats 
The Web is rich with deceptive content that lures users into downloading malware. ENISA 
and Niels, Moheeb and Panayiotis (2009) express concerns over compromises to cloud 
servers due to Social engineering attacks, Drive by exploits or Drive-by downloads. Due to 
the human factor, Social engineering, Drive-by downloads and insider threats still pose a high 
security threat to cloud computing. 
  Access control violations 
The ability to emulate hardware via software (Virtualisation) is one of the underlying 
technologies that drive cloud computing. This provides the ability to run several virtual 
machines (VM) on the emulation software stack (Hypervisor) which creates the possibility for 
multi-tenancy and the ability to reallocate resources as needed for elasticity and scalability. 
However, resource reallocation creates the possibility that sectors containing for instance one 
tenant’s deleted files which have moved into other co-tenants VM can be recovered by those 
co-tenants. In addition, IP addresses of VM or hosts freed during server relocations which are 
allowed access into the cloud environment may return to public pools and be used by 
malicious attackers to access a cloud environment. Heterogeneity in cloud access control 
interfaces is another serious access control security issue. This makes it difficult for 
organisations to move their access control policies along when the switch cloud service 
providers. Existing literature has shown that even though individual domain policies are 
verified, security violations can easily occur during integration (Hassan, James and Gail, 
2010). Access control violations threaten all cloud computing service delivery models. Table 1 
shows the various security threats some cloud vendors are concerned about (Intel IT Centre, 
2011). 
 
Table 1: Cloud security threats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Cloud Security Solutions 
 
There are yet no generally accepted security standards for cloud computing however, some cloud 
security standards by various organisations like CSA, NIST and FISMA are beginning to have 
widespread adoption by CSPs. Examples of such standards are the Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) and 
Security, Trust and Assurance Registry (STAR) created by the CSA. Our research findings show that 
several CSPs are applying different cloud security solutions, however there are similarities in their 
usage of security mechanism and appliances. Privacy rules are not in favour of proper cloud 
consumer activity monitoring however Service Level Agreements (SLA) are now used in creating a 
balance between the responsibilities and expectations of both the CSP and the cloud service 
consumer. This goes a long way in alleviating the threat posed by the abuse of cloud computing 
infrastructure and issues of service availability. Defining security policies in the cloud on host-basis is 
being used as a solution to the threat of hypervisor security level implementation. The advantage of 
this is that a security configuration remains with a cloud host as it travels (Chris, 2011). Several 
organisations and governments have invested in training security experts to combat the incompetency 
problem amongst cloud security experts (The Chartered Institute for IT, 2013). There is yet no 
CSPs Security Threats 
Carpathia Lack or immature trust extensions in hypervisors and cloud ecosystem. 
Cisco Lack of cloud standards, inadequate security for cloud automation, lack of 
automation for security service provisioning, inadequate encryption key 
management and the overhead of encryption. 
Citrix Administrative mistakes and lack of approved workflow.  
Expedient Insufficient end-to-end chains of trust and inadequate encryption key 
management. 
HyTrust Inadequate virtualization security, authentication and access control.  
McAfee Distributed data storage problems, access control issues, cloud consumer 
lock-ins and incomplete data deletion.  
OpSource Constantly changing security requirements and lack of cloud security 
standards. 
Trapezoid Assurance that data is secure irrespective of its constantly changing location. 
Virtustream 
 
Incomplete data deletion, software integrity assurance issues, insufficient data 
encryption in motion and transference of application authentication.  
guarantee for a complete deletion of data by cloud providers on client requests however; FADE has 
shown to be a promising solution to this threat (Yang et al., 2012).  
 
Assigning a random threshold for every file stored in the cloud and performing deduplication only if 
the number of copies of the file exceeds this threshold, is shown to solve some data integrity violation 
issues in the cloud (Danny, Benny and Alexandra, 2010). Many CSPs have also deployed Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) Systems within their clouds therefore, are now able to 
generate and manage log reports. This is largely possible by the use of Big Data for general threat 
analysis issues (Jennifer, 2012) (Intel IT Centre, 2011) (Chris, 2011). The Cisco IronPort S-Series 
web security appliance was among security solutions to solve cloud access control issues. 2-factor 
Authentication with RSA SecurID and close monitoring appeared to be the most popular solutions to 
authentication and access control in the cloud. Database Active Monitoring, File Active Monitoring, 
URL Filters and Data Loss Prevention were solutions for detecting and preventing unauthorised data 
migration into and within clouds (Intel IT Centre, 2011) (Cloud Security Alliance, 2010). Encryption of 
all data at storage and during transmission, use of hypervisor security at the hardware level as well as 
use of query re-writers at the database level are being used as solutions to the multi-tenancy and data 
leakage security threats. Mohemed, John and Amani (2011) demonstrated how to utilise existing 
security automation efforts to facilitate Cloud Service Security Management Process using a SaaS 
application to secure multi-tenant cloud environment. Table 2 summarises the security solutions 
against the cloud security threats identified by CSPs as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 2: Cloud Security Solutions 
 
 
As a solution to security threats due to Insecure interfaces and APIs, cloud API developers validate 
and sanitize all inputs both on the client and server side of their source code, encrypt or hash data 
before inserting them into a DDS and adopt secure software development lifecycle (Nasser, 2013) 
(Steve, 2013). There is yet no fool-proof approach towards tackling the issues of insider threats but 
sound physical access control procedures, least privilege access, sanctions and proper security and 
criminal record checks on cloud security personnel is widely practiced. The use of distributed 
  CSPs              Security threats                     Security solutions 
Carpathia Lack or immature trust extensions in 
hypervisors and cloud ecosystem. 
Use of modern CPUs and chipsets paired with a policy 
engine controlling orchestration to allow a chain of trust 
from the hardware to the hypervisor to the operating system 
by using modern appliances such as the Intel TXT. 
Cisco Lack of cloud standards, automation 
problems and inadequate encryption key 
management. 
Standardizations as CSA, (ISO) 27001 and 27002 and 
FISMA, encryption of all data at rest and in transit. Cisco 
ASA 5585-X Appliance – Firewall, Cisco IronPort S-Series 
web security appliance and use of SAML to secure SaaS 
applications. 
Citrix Administrative mistakes and lack of 
approved workflow. 
Enforcement of a workflow enabled administrative solution. 
Expedient Insufficient end-to-end chains of trust and 
inadequate encryption key management. 
Use of Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT). 
Protection of identity through process and governance. 
HyTrust Inadequate virtualization security, 
authentication and access control. 
2-factor authentication with RSA SecurID or smart cards, 
root password vaulting, accountability and leveraging any 
pre-existing investment in LDAP or Microsoft Active 
Directory. 
McAfee Distributed data storage problems, access 
control issues, cloud consumer lock-ins and 
incomplete data deletion. 
Cloud Identity Manager which auto-provisions and de-
provisions cloud accounts, use of Single-Sign-On, policy-
based enforcement and 2-Factor-Authentication.  
OpSource Constantly changing security requirements 
and lack of cloud security standards. 
A combination of SAS 70, PCI, SSAE 16, ISO 27001 
27002, FISMA and CSA security standards.  
Trapezoid Assurance that data is secure irrespective 
of its constantly changing location. 
Adoption of SecRAMP Security implementations, use of 
Intel TXT and Cisco Unified Computing System platform. 
 
Virtustream 
Incomplete data deletion, software integrity 
assurance issues, insufficient data 
encryption in motion and transference of 
application authentication. 
Encryption of all data at rest using the Intel AES-NI (in the 
CPU) and encryption of data during transmission. 
application firewalls and application-level proxies implemented inside a perimeter firewall, which are 
based on decentralized information flow control (DIFC) models that supports a decentralized creation 
and management of security classes at runtime are being used as solution to access control and trust 
propagation issues (Jennifer, 2012). Intel TXT has been widely adopted by several CSPs as a 
solution for trust propagation from the hardware to the hypervisor and to the operating system. Multi-
threaded IDS deployed across IaaS, PaaS and SaaS cloud infrastructures have proved effective in 
mitigating malware attacks in cloud environments. Not until recently did Amazon announce that its 
Hardware Security Module (CloudHSM) is a solution to the problem of proper digital certificate, 
encryption and cryptographic key management, but this service is relatively expensive and may be 
unaffordable by individuals and small firms. With AWS CloudHSM, customers maintain full ownership, 
control and access to keys and sensitive data while Amazon manages the HSM appliances in close 
proximity to their applications and data for maximum performance (Fahmida, 2013).  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we reviewed the recent cloud security threats and solution models. This is a starting 
point towards identifying and exploring further the security threats facing the cloud. An understanding 
of recent security threats in the cloud and their current solutions are important in finding lasting 
solutions to cloud security issues. Solutions to cloud security threats are by far not a single 
organisation’s or industry’s responsibility. Security experts in the industry, the academia, various 
organisations and government need to collaborate towards finding a lasting solution to cloud security 
problems. Therefore more research is needed in this area for better appreciation of the issues facing 
cloud security. This review serves as to provide more awareness to the recent security threats in 
cloud computing and the current solution models employed in tackling them, and most importantly as 
a scratching surface towards our on-going research into intrusion detection systems (IDS) in cloud 
based environment. We recommend the adaptation and reuse of standard SOA security frameworks 
such as SAML and WS-Trust in authenticating and federating trust in securing cloud environments. 
Perhaps the only way to guarantee the security of data at all times is to invest in the latest solutions 
on the market that can be used to ensure it is not breached by hackers or other unauthorised 
individuals (BCS The Chartered Institute for IT, 2013). 
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